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Thank you. Good afternoon everyone.  
My name, as Shin san (MC) has said, is 
Kate Fearon. I currently work for the 
European Union, External Action Service, 
but today I want to speak to you about my 
involvement in the Northern Irish Peace 
Process and to share with you a little bit of 
our experience there and what we learned 
in our very small part of the world.  I hope 
that you might find some interesting 
parallels with some of your work here.   
     I want to talk a little bit about, as the 
last speaker Professor Park did,  of peace 
building not so much the physical 
reconstruction (as Dr Abe did), but the 
political reconstruction.  It’s very difficult 
to talk about, a small, but complex problem 
that’s about 400 years in duration in 20 
minutes, so I skip right to the beginning of 
the mid-1990s when the Northern Irish 
issue had reached mutually hurting 
stalemate.  I just want to check with you, 
how many of you are anyway familiar with 
the conflict in Northern Ireland?  Hands-
up.  Okay, so some not, some are.  Okay, 
maybe I will go back a little bit. 
     In Northern Ireland, it’s very, very 
small country and the center of our world 
is Europe, as we see it.  So, Northern 
Ireland, a very small part of the island of 
Ireland, which previously was colonized by 
the United Kingdom right up until the 
early 20th century, was colonized, so in 
1922, the southern part of Ireland became 
a republic, became independent, but the 
northern part remained part of the United 
Kingdom and remained so to this day, but 
the fact of its remaining part of the United 
Kingdom was very contentious and was 
contested physically in a violent conflict, 
many times over the centuries since 1609 
to be precise, but most recently in a conflict 
mainly in Northern Ireland beginning in 
1969-1970, and lasting right through until 
1996.  But, around the start of the 1990s, 
what we call a mutually hurting stalemate 
basically that no side was going to win, was 
the status. So the British government had 
the army on the streets of Northern Ireland 
and lots of police there as well, and there 
were paramilitary groups that were 
fighting against the British government.  
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There were paramilitary groups that were 
fighting against nationalist community.  
The nationalist community wanted to 
become part of a political whole island of 
Ireland.  The Unionist community wanted 
to retain the link with the United Kingdom.  
So, by a mutually hurting stalemate – just 
to give you an idea of the conflict – in that 
30-year period, there were around 3,000 
people were killed.  Around 40,000 people 
were injured.  There were around 52,000 
incidents and that’s about five incidents a 
day, every day for 30 years.  That’s around 
11,000 days and every day there were, 
sometimes small, sometimes larger 
incidents. 
     So, obviously this couldn’t go on.  
This was a conflict that was taking place in 
the domestic territory of a member of the 
UN Security Council.  A member, at the 
time, certainly of the most developed 
countries in the world, so it was quite an 
embarrassment for the UK government and 
even though the UN troops were 
contemplated at one stage, the British 
government never wanted to 
internationalize the conflict, so the way of 
defining the conflict was also a site for 
contention and arguably remains so.  
There had been a number of attempts by 
the time we come to the peace process that 
I will address, a number of attempts to 
resolve the conflict on the constitutional 
means and in 1996, there was a new process 
proposed and this was because several of 
the paramilitary organizations had 
declared a ceasefire and so the British and 
Irish governments concluded that the 
conditions held potential for the first time 
to really get everybody around the table 
and to have a new discussion certainly. 
     As part of that process, I along with a 
group of women lobbied very strongly for 
the traditional parties to include the 
women’s agenda and to include women in 
their own political parties in the 
negotiations about the peace talks, but the 
political parties completely ignored us and 
that was their first big mistake because we 
didn’t like it so much that we were ignored 
so explicitly.  So we decided to form our 
own political party and we did that about 6 
weeks before the election, and we formed a 
political party that would ensure that 
women’s concerns were brought to the fore.  
We were concerned with widening the 
agenda somewhat and the traditional 
parties were chiefly concerned with the 
constitutional question.  So, they were 
concerned with essentially the relationship 
at a regional parliamentary level within 
Northern Ireland.  The relationship 
between the rest of the United Kingdom, 
the government in London and the 
government in Belfast and then the 
relationship between the government in 
London and the government in Dublin. 
     What we were concerned about was 
the actual process, how the process would 
be handled?  How it would be managed?  
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What it would look like?  We were very 
concerned always to, when we got elected, 
to ensure that we reached out to the local 
communities to ensure that we reflected 
their views within the formal political 
process, so we tried to include as many 
people as possible in our policy discussions 
and to constantly include by consulting the 
community.  What we wanted to do in 
terms of the actual agenda which was 
narrowly focused on these constitutional 
issues, we wanted to expand the agenda.  
We wanted to make the pie bigger before we 
divided it up between ourselves.  So, the 
Northern Ireland Peace Process lasted for 
about 2 years, from 1996-1998.  It was 
chaired by the US Senator, George Mitchell, 
and the British government and the Irish 
governments were heavily involved in that.  
While there was eventually a resolution on 
the constitutional issues, it really was that 
Northern Ireland would remain within the 
United Kingdom, so there was not enough 
appetite within Northern Ireland for this 
little place to become part of the republic of 
Ireland, but there was agreement on a 
regional parliament, an assembly, as we 
call it – and agreement on parliament and 
an agreement to have a formal relationship 
between Belfast and Dublin, the two sides, 
north and south of the island and, but there 
were some additional things which we as a 
Women’s Coalition wanted to put on the 
agenda and successfully put on the agenda 
and they were things like the incorporation 
of the European Convention on Human 
Rights into our domestic legislation, which 
was the first place, I believe, in the United 
Kingdom where that happened. 
     We wanted the establishment of a 
Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission, which would have the power 
to propose a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland, which would take account of the 
specific context of the conflict from which 
we had come.  We wanted, and were 
successful in requiring, that public bodies 
obliged to have regard to equality in their 
public duties.   We also were really the 
only party that put forward proposals on 
reconciliation and dealing with the past 
and they weren’t popular at the time with 
any political party when we proposed them, 
but we made the case successfully.  
However, we didn't get as strong provisions 
as we would like, but references to those 
issues were in our agreement and the 
agreement was passed by popular 
referendum, so we were able to use those in 
the years since as building blocks to move 
forward on those agendas. 
     In terms of the implementation of the 
peace agreement, these things take time.  
In our experience, you can move forward, 
move backwards.  There are times of great 
hope and there are times of great despair, 
but you need to have faith in the process 
and that was really why we had our real 
concerns about how the process was 
designed in the first instance because if the 
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process is strong it will withstand the 
rollercoaster ride that is frequently a peace 
process or reconciliation process or in fact 
any negotiation process, so being strong on 
the process and allowing things to settle 
down and giving things time to settle down 
for people to get used to new realities, new 
normalities and new changes. I think that 
can’t be overestimated since when people 
are ingrained in a certain mentality that’s 
been handed down to them for 300-400 
years, it takes a little time and you don’t 
change that in 2 or 3 years. 
     It’s important to try to build trust.  
Some people actively resist trusting others 
but you have to have faith and have some 
degree of optimism in a process like this.  I 
believe there needs to be some 
transparency.  Not everything can be 
negotiated in public, but certainly I believe 
parties to negotiations should make the 
broad thrust under principles very, very 
public, but it needs the willingness of all 
parties to that so having determination to 
move things forward.   Also something 
which was important in our process was 
mentoring from external actors, but also 
kind of external actors pushing you forward, 
so we had a very strong input from the 
United States government when it became 
at times of high tension for example, we 
will be at the level where Bill Clinton the 
President at the time would be phoning the 
political leaders, phoning Gerry Adams, 
phoning Ian Paisley, saying this is the time 
you’ve got to do it, so having that external 
actor was very important as well as having 
the British and Irish governments there all 
the time. I would also say the notion of 
money is important. Part of what happened 
with our process and what helped sustain 
our process was that we had a great deal of 
– in a sense – reconstruction money.  It 
was a peace and reconciliation agenda 
structural funds for communities who had 
been living for a long time with high levels 
of unemployment who were impoverished, 
who had low educational attainment and so 
special programs were designed which the 
European Union funded which ensured 
that people were able to be included and 
maintain a sense of optimism of 
participating in or having a stake in the 
future and this was – now it would be over 
20 years and it’s like 300 million, even more. 
The European Union monies were 
especially important for border 
communities, so people living in border 
areas, so on this side on the northern side 
of the border and on the southern side of 
the border.  So, introducing people to each 
other and ensuring that the peace would 
hold that once there is an agreement, you 
really need to ensure that it is knitted into 
the fabric of the society and that’s what we 
tried to do with making sure that things 
like social inclusion was a strong principle 
in our peace process even if there were no 
explicit provisions saying A, B and C, but 
these kind of, what would be seen as more 
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soft power issues, were something that we 
promoted as a Northern Ireland Women’s 
Coalition and that we think have stood the 
test of time since.  I noted earlier the 
tendency for a peace process is to go up and 
down and there were times when certain 
people were kicked out of the talks process 
because the paramilitary groups had 
committed violent acts again and broke 
their ceasefire, but again you need to 
remain committed and to keep the faith in 
the process. 
     Dealing with the past is something 
that we referenced in the agreement, but 
we haven’t been able to move on and part of 
the reason we are back in a political 
stalemate at the minute and part of the 
reason is, in my view, that this issue of 
dealing with the past was not properly 
addressed at the time, when we did the 
agreement in 1998, almost 20 years ago 
now.  It took 2 years of really intensive 
negotiations, 1996 through 1998, to get the 
agreement and we have been trying to 
implement it for the last 20 years, and for 
some parts we have done it, but for large 
part also it’s found wanting.  That’s not 
necessarily because the agreement was 
flawed although certainly wasn’t perfect, 
but it’s got to do with the political will of 
political parties to actually implement it 
and to continue to reach out to the local 
community. 
     So, I think that for political 
negotiations, for peace negotiation, it’s 
important to include a range of voices and 
important that local communities see 
themselves reflected in the people who are 
doing the negotiations and it’s important 
that that continues through the 
implementation phase under the – that 
when you start an implementation phase, I 
think you have to be very conscious that it 
takes some time and the issues which may 
seem the softest like reconciliation or 
dealing with the past, they can be the 
hardest to deal with because it’s such an 
emotional thing for everyone and they often 
can’t admit that what actually happened, 
so we don’t have a definition of what 
actually happened in our past and that will 
prevent us from moving forward to claim a 
better future.   
     Thank you.  
  
─ 39 ─
